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Abstract 
The article analyzes the interaction between employee ownership, HRM policies and practices and 
HRM outcomes in the world‘s biggest industrial worker cooperative for decades and now defunct 
Fagor Electrodomésticos. Using longitudinal data and detailed interviews with key stakeholders, this 
paper sheds light on how employee ownership conditioned HRM policies. HRM outcomes – such as 
job satisfaction and absenteeism – are also analyzed over a long period of time and for diverse 
groups in the workforce defined in terms of ownership, age, tenure, salary or professional status. 
Chronic nepotism when recruiting new members, failures in the training policy, impoverished and 
Taylorist working systems and reverse dominance hierarchies are analyzed as factors that increased 
free riding and caused low satisfaction and the disengagement of working members. This case study 
contributes to the literature on HRM and worker cooperatives as it provides some insights that are 
rarely found in that literature. It also gives guidance to worker cooperatives about increasing the fit 
between employee ownership and HRM policies and outcomes.   
 Keywords: Absenteeism; Satisfaction; Employee participation; Conflict; Attitudes: Recruitment; 
Culture and climate; Worker Cooperatives; Employee Ownership;  
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‘The form of association, however, which if mankind continues to improve, 
must be expected in the end to predominate, is not that which can exist between 
a capitalist as chief, and work-people without a voice in the management, but 
the association of the labourers themselves on terms of equality, collectively 
owning the capital with which they carry on their operations, and working 
under managers elected and removable by themselves’ 
 John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy,  1852 (p. 772).  
Introduction 
 
Collective ownership by employees has been on the agenda of economists, managers, philosophers 
and policy makers for many years as indicated by the opening citation from English philosopher and 
political economist John Stuart Mill. The theoretical positive expectations of employee ownership 
(e.g. Pierce and Furo, 1990; Pierce et al., 1991; Rousseau and Shperling, 2003) and its empirical 
outcomes (e.g. Hammer et al., 1981; Long, 1982; French and Rosenstein, 1984; Kruse and Blasi, 
1995; Kruse, 1996, 2002) have been discussed at some length in the scholarly literature over recent 
decades. Yet, with few exceptions, little consideration has been given in most of the work to the 
embeddedness of employee ownership policies within Human Resource Management (HRM). As a 
result, many research gaps are found. For example, whether, for the success of the shared project, the 
employee owners should or should not have a substantive ‘voice in the management’ - to use Mill’s 
words. Or in a similar vein, drawing on the quotation, what would be the real implications of 
working under managers elected and removable by employees?  
A growing number of researchers (Kaarsemaker and Poutsma, 2006; Blasi et al. 2013) have 
emphasized that the employee ownership perspective should be integrated into a coherent HRM 
framework. Potential complementarities and clashes between employee ownership and HRM 
policies and practices such as recruitment, evaluation and compensation need to be researched more 
deeply. 
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Similarly, the employee collective examined in the employee-owned organizations has been viewed 
as homogeneous, but the characteristics of the ‘work-people’ involved in the quite diverse 
experiences of employee ownership are heterogeneous in terms of age, gender, qualifications, rank 
and stability, and on many other measures (Blasi et al., 2013; Mullins et al., 2016), and those factors 
have attracted little attention in the scholarly literature.  
In order to elucidate these under-researched issues in employee ownership it could be wise to focus 
on the long-standing and rich experience of fully employee-owned firms such as worker 
cooperatives. Among the many cooperative experiences in the world, Mondragon is among the most 
studied (e.g. Sun, 2003; Abrams, 2008). The scattered academic literature on Mondragon 
cooperatives provides some evidence that some HRM policies and practices can be severely 
moderated by employee ownership (e.g. Basterretxea and Albizu, 2010; Heras-Saizarbitoria, 2014; 
Basterretxea and Storey, 2017).   
Taking into account the gaps in the literature, this article has two objectives. First, it analyzes 
potential clashes between ownership and HRM policies and practices in worker cooperatives. 
Second, it analyzes the effects of employee ownership and HRM practices on HRM outcomes for a 
heterogeneous workforce in worker cooperatives. To that end, the case of a fully employee-owned 
firm is studied in depth – the now defunct Fagor Electrodomésticos. Shedding light on the HRM 
factors and policies that contributed to the demise of Fagor Electrodomésticos provides an 
opportunity for other companies to learn from their experience and devise strategies to avoid the 
same fate. 
This article contributes to the scholarly literature in several ways. First, the work provides empirical 
evidence of potential clashes between “fuller” forms of employee ownership and HRM policies and 
practices. Second, it contributes to filling the gap in the employee ownership literature, where the 
workforce and its response to ownership has traditionally been viewed as homogeneous. Third, the 
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analysis complements the existing literature on worker cooperatives by reporting the reasoning used 
by different key stake-holders to account for HRM policies and their effect on employee attitudes 
and behaviors. This helps to explain the cooperative model and its complementarity with other HRM 
policies. Fourth, it also contributes to the rigorous analysis of HRM policies in relevant cooperative 
experiences such as Mondragon, which scholars have tended to view in a rather idealized way and 
previous analysis of management policies has been rather superficial (Heras-Saizarbitoria, 2014).  
The paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews the literature related to understanding 
some HRM specificities in employee-owned firms, with a special focus on the specific case of the 
fully employee-owned organizations - i.e. cooperatives. The review sheds light on how these factors 
can contribute to different attitudinal and behavioral responses of heterogeneous workforces. This is 
followed by an outline of the research methods used in the project reported here, including a brief 
profile of the case-studied organization. The next section summarizes the results of the field-work. 
The final section is devoted to discussion and conclusions. 
Literature review and research questions 
Empirical studies on the effects of employee ownership on employee attitudes and behaviors 
increasingly stress the importance of complementing employee ownership with high-performance 
HRM policies in order to generate higher commitment (Blasi et al. 2008 Kaarsemaker and Poustma, 
2006; Kruse et al, 2004, 2010; Kurtulus and Kruse, 2017, among others). Some authors (Kruse et al. 
2004, Freeman et al. 2010 and Caramelli, 2011) also stress the importance of developing a corporate 
culture that combats free-riding to increase commitment in employee owned firms.  
While research is increasingly focused on HRM policies that complement employee ownership, 
additional research is needed to find HRM policies and practices that clash with employee 
ownership. There is also a need for researching restrictions on HRM managers’ action in employee 
stock ownership (ESO) firms and in cooperatives. The scholarly literature about fully employee 
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owned organizations, such as of Mondragon’s cooperatives, demonstrates that a set of HRM policies 
and practices may be strongly conditioned by employee ownership. Indeed, employee owners in this 
type of company have historically opposed many HRM practices, such as individual performance 
evaluations, pay-for-performance systems, or plans to increase salary differentials to attract and 
retain senior managers and technicians (Whyte and Whyte, 1988; Kasmir, 1996; Basterretxea and 
Storey, 2017). Moreover, certain HRM policies and practices that are taken for granted in the 
tradition of fully employee-owned firms such as cooperatives can run counter to the 
recommendations of the HRM literature and even clash with them.  
The first clash often takes place in the Recruitment and Selection policy. Freedom of HR managers 
to apply desirable Recruitment and Selection policies and practices can be severely restricted in 
worker cooperatives. Nepotism and cronyism in recruitment of new members has been frequent in 
different cooperative firms and other collectivistic organizations, from the Israeli Kibbutz (Van den 
Berghe, P. L., & Peter, K,1988), French industrial and agricultural cooperatives (Pasquet and Liarte, 
2012; Juban et al. 2015), and Australian consumer co-operatives (Balnave and Paltmore, 2005), to 
American cooperatives (Rothschild and Whitt, 1989). Cooperatives search for a homogeneous 
workforce and select a membership that shares basic values and a worldview (Rothschild and Whitt, 
1989). Besides value homogeneity, a key alleged reason for nepotistic recruitment policies in worker 
cooperatives is the so-called “horizon problem” (Borgen, 2004; Jensen and Meckling, 1979). In the 
absence of freely tradable owner shares, worker owners in a cooperative are not properly motivated 
to invest, unless they expect to remain in the company for the entire payback term. Mondragon 
cooperatives have historically overcome this problem by linking cooperatives to a limited 
geographical environment, “a fact that fosters the informal inheritance of the job” (Arruñada, 1990, 
143) and giving preference to descendants of members of the cooperative when recruiting. The 
policy of hiring descendants of cooperative members solves the horizon problem, but can also have a 
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harmful impact on several aspects of people management, including adverse selection, lower job 
satisfaction, intention to quit, negative word of mouth and job stress (Arasli et al., 2006; Arasli and 
Tumer, 2008; Ford and McLaughlin, 1986; Sidany and Thornberry, 2013). In addition, nepotism in 
hiring policies can undermine the basic cooperative principles of Open Membership and Concern for 
Community. 
Restrictions in the Pay policy impose even further limitations on Recruitment and Selection policy in 
worker cooperatives when firms try to attract valuable and scarce human resources for managerial 
and technical positions. In fact, limited salary differentials between workers and managers can make 
it very difficult to recruit managers from Investor Owner Firms (Basterretxea and Albizu, 2011). 
HRM policies can be also conditioned by the cooperative “degeneration” process. The academic 
literature on employee-owned business has been dominated by the “degeneration thesis” (Ben-Ner, 
1984; Bonin et al. 1993; Meister, 1984; Miyazaki, 1984; Webb and Webb, 1920). According to this 
view, cooperatives are bound to fail or to degenerate into capitalist forms of business. The most 
visible sign of degeneration is directly linked to the recruitment policy: the employment of a growing 
percentage of wage-laborers instead of members. HRM policies and outcomes can also be influenced 
by ‘organizational degeneration’ - a process that increasingly concentrates power and control in 
managers’ hands - and by ‘goal degeneration’ - cooperatives increasingly prioritizing profits or 
growth as their prime purpose (Cornforth, 1995). 
According to the degeneration literature, worker cooperatives often have a ‘life cycle’ in which 
degeneration takes place gradually. In a first stage, idealism and commitment are high, decisions are 
made in the assembly, but economic activity is poorly established; then, if the cooperative survives, 
conventional principles of organisation are adopted, indifference substitutes initial idealism and the 
power of management is reinforced; third, degeneration signs are many, democracy becomes 
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restricted to a representative board and goal degeneration takes place; fourth, members and their 
representatives lose all their power and managers assume total control (Meister, 1984). 
Despite the prevalence of the degeneration thesis, many authors (Batstone, 1983; Cornforth, 1995; 
Estrin and Jones, 1992; Hernandez, 2006; Storey et al., 2014) have argued that cooperative 
degeneration is not inevitable; cooperatives can also regenerate. 
Far from concentrating power and control in a few oligarchic hands as the degeneration thesis 
predicts, some cooperatives can develop a “reverse dominance hierarchy”, a kind of hierarchy in 
which “followers dominate their leaders rather than vice versa” (Boehm, 1993, 228). Cooperatives 
developing a reverse dominance hierarchy would be characterized by a “presence of largely 
powerless chiefs” and a formal “managerial structure that does not translate into the exertion of 
much power and authority by chiefs over subordinated workers” (Jaumier, 2017, 221). This 
particular hierarchy can restrict managers’ action and limit their choice when it comes to applying 
certain HRM policies, even if these are seen as being more effective. Limitations on decision-making 
can also extend to middle-management and supervisors (Basterretxea and Storey, 2017).  
Reverse dominance hierarchy in worker cooperatives may partially explain the historical difficulty of 
implementing individual performance evaluations and performance-based remuneration in some 
Mondragon cooperatives (Whyte and Whyte, 1988; Kasmir, 1996; Basterretxea and Storey, 2017). 
Difficulties in implementing performance evaluation and performance related pay can increase the 
risk of “free-riding”, a problem that can be a major source of negative attitudinal and behavioral 
outcomes in employee-owned companies (Bonin et al 1993; Klein, 1987; Kruse et al. 2004; 
McCarthy et al. 2010; Pendleton and Robinson, 2010; Basterretxea and Storey, 2017).    
Given that most researchers consider that employee ownership only produces positive attitudinal and 
behavioral responses if embedded in bundles of high performance HRM practices (Blasi et al., 2008; 
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Caramelli, 2011; Kruse et al., 2010), and considering that potential clashes between HRM practices 
and employee ownership are under-studied, the following research question is formulated: 
Research question 1: How does employee ownership in worker cooperatives condition HRM policies 
and practices and the achievement of better HRM outcomes? 
To the best of our knowledge, only the paper by Klein and Hall (1988) considers a wide range of 
factors that make it possible to know how different workforces respond to employee ownership.  
According to their findings, satisfaction is positively related to individual characteristics such as age, 
salary, and tenure, but negatively related to level of education. They also suggested that these 
characteristics could be moderated by organizational factors. In this regard, age could be a significant 
determinant in companies in which employees have to wait until their retirement to recover their 
initial investment. Pendleton (2005) found evidence that age, orientation towards participating in 
stock ownership and portfolio diversification have a positive effect on stock-holding behavior. 
Contrary to his expectations, income and risk preferences had little effect on stock-holding. 
Ownership status has also been analysed. Using data from a number of different satisfaction surveys 
conducted in Mondragon’s retail cooperative, Eroski, Arando et al (2015) and Basterretxea and 
Storey (2017) found that cooperative working members were less satisfied than workers with partial 
ownership through an ESO plan. Similarly, they were less satisfied than employees who had no 
ownership rights. Basterretxea and Storey (2017) also found higher absenteeism rates among 
working owners in the cooperative. Raised but unfilled expectations of participation are mentioned in 
both studies as a cause of negative HRM outcomes. Almost 100% employment security, an 
egalitarian pay policy and worsening pay and labor conditions during the crisis were also found to be 
factors that promoted complacency and free riding of some members (Basterretxea and Storey, 
2017).  
10 
 
Attitudes towards employee ownership are worse among lower paid and economically insecure 
workers, given the extra risk that employee ownership implies to the income of partners (Blasi et al. 
2010); and among those with less business literacy (Comeau, 1993, Kasmir, 1996). In her analysis of 
Fagor, Kasmir (1996) found a stronger sense of ownership and stronger feeling of being part of the 
firm among technicians and managers than among rank and file cooperative workers.  
Instead of analyzing responses of employee owners as a whole, it is important to analyze the 
different responses of employees according to different workforce characteristics. Therefore, the 
following research question is proposed: 
Research question 2: How do attitudinal and behavioral responses of employee owners in a working 
cooperative differ depending on different workforce characteristics (e.g. employment status, age, 
employee rank)?   
We address the research questions by studying the case of Fagor Electrodomésticos, S.Coop..  
Fagor Electrodomésticos S.Coop.: Summary Profile 
A brief historical review of Fagor Electrodomésticos S.Coop (hereafter referred to as Fagor) is given 
in Molina (2012) and Errasti et al. (2016), but the key points are summarized here.  
Before its decline and eventual closure in November 2013, Fagor had been the flagship of the 
Mondragon Cooperative Group, one of the largest industrial groups in Spain. At the height of its 
success in the household appliance industry in 2006, it was a multinational with 18 production plants 
in six countries (8 in Spain, 4 in France, 1 in Poland, 1 in Italy, 3 in China and 1 in Morocco), sales 
of 1,729 million euro, 6% of the European market and a workforce of 10,543 employees. Fagor was 
created in 1956 with a culture that emphasised the values of solidarity, self-sacrifice, democracy, 
concern for the welfare of the community and an organization in which the sovereignty of labour 
prevailed over capital (Molina, 2012). After a successful period in the Spanish market, in the late 
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1980s it began an international expansion into North Africa and Latin America. Between 1996 and 
2001, it made major investments in its Spanish plants and entered a number of joint ventures with 
leading international firms. In 1999 Fagor bought the Polish white goods company Wrozamet. In 
2005, it bought Brandt Electroménager, the French leader in household appliances. At one point it 
was the fifth largest manufacturer of household appliances in Europe after Electrolux, Whirpool, 
Bosch Siemens and Merloni (Molina, 2012). As happens with other Mondragon cooperatives, 
cooperative ownership was not offered to the employees of the foreign subsidiaries that Fagor 
acquired. In addition, close to 15% of the worforce in the parent company were temporary 
employees who had no ownership rights.   
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
The acquisition of Brandt was to mark a turning point in Fagor’s history (Ortega and Uriarte, 2015). 
Because of difficulty accessing the capital market, the company financed its internal and external 
growth strategies through borrowing, with a negative effect on its books. When the financial crisis 
broke in 2008, the property market in Spain collapsed (in 2007 close to 700,000 new houses were 
built, but in 2013 and 2014 around 74,000 and 45,000 were built, respectively), together with the 
market for domestic appliances in Spain, the firm’s most important market. Fagor’s already difficult 
situation was further worsened by the emergence of new Asian competitors, leading to a sharp 
decline in Fagor's sales and margins. Measures such as liquidity injection by the Mondragon 
Corporation, staff relocations to other Mondragon cooperatives, early retirement and reductions in 
advances and salaries, were not enough to stave off bankruptcy proceedings.    
 
Methods 
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The research was based on field-work based mainly on qualitative data obtained through in-depth 
interviews with a set of representative and reliable internal and external stakeholders of Fagor. 
Complementary to this, very extensive internal and external (public) corporate data related to Fagor 
over extended periods of time were analyzed.  
Regarding the qualitative analysis, 25 interviews were conducted with a cross section of people 
involved with the cooperative in a variety of roles in order to try to increase the richness and the 
reliability of the information (Miles and Huberman 1994). Referencing and snowball sampling were 
used to define a sample of stakeholders to interview. These included 12 senior executives (3 of them 
also representatives of the Governing Council and 2 of them also members of the Social Council for 
different periods of time), 6 rank and file worker owners, including 3 leading representatives of the 
Social Council for the last 25 years of the firm, a senior union official who defended non-owner 
employees during the bankruptcy process,  3 senior managers in Mondragon central offices, and 4 
senior Basque Government officials responsible for industrial policy. Most of the former managers 
and rank and file workers who were interviewed had been working for Fagor for at least two decades 
and in many cases had quite conflicting and contending perspectives. External stakeholders who 
were interviewed had also been closely associated with Fagor and Mondragon Corporation for long 
periods of time.  
The interviews were conducted between October 2015 and September 2017, after the collapse of the 
company. This phase of data collection was stopped at the point of saturation (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Francis et al., 2010). Interviews focused on the choices and events that, in the view of the 
interviewees, were critical to explain the demise of the company. In order to gain the participants’ 
trust and avoid organizational silence, social desirability and other similar bias such as the potential 
tendency of the interviewees to approach the interviews cathartically (Heras-Saizarbitoria, 2014), the 
solely scholarly aim of the research, the diversity of the background of the respondents, the 
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respondents’ anonymity and the confidentiality of all information obtained were guaranteed. All 
interviews were recorded and professionally transcribed.  
A grounded theory method of interpretation was used for data analysis, an inductive analytical 
method with great potential for this type of research (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). According to this 
approach, data interpretation must be based on a set of categories that emerge from the study. The 
iterative process of data categorization and interpretation was conducted by the three authors. This 
process applied to the semi-structured interviews made it possible to identify passages that illustrate 
the main themes (i.e. drivers for the failure of Fagor) emerging from the category analysis.  
Regarding the more relevant external (public) data, this paper draws extensively on secondary 
sources such as annual reports, official reports and the Bankruptcy Report, written by the insolvency 
administrator. With regard to the internal data, many internal reports on HRM outcomes for extended 
periods of time were analyzed. More specifically, the results of the three last satisfaction surveys 
conducted by Fagor Electrodomésticos in 2003, 2005 and 2008 and longitudinal monthly data on 
absenteeism for the different business units from 1995 to 2013 were analyzed. We also had access to 
several internal in depth analyses of absence management conducted by Fagor’s HRM department 
between 2005 and 2010. Those documents analysed the causes of sick leave rates for different 
workforce segments and proposed measures to the Governing Council and to the General Assembly 
to reduce voluntary absenteeism. It was not possible to conduct regressions because the microdata of 
those surveys were not available. The firm no longer exists, and much data has been destroyed or 
mislaid. The satisfaction surveys and the analyses of absenteeism in Fagor were not collected for 
academic research purposes, and results are not presented in a way that allows the derivation of 
further descriptive statistics. Yet some weakness on the data is compensated for, since longitudinal 
data collected by HR managers in Fagor comes from a large sample of employees that would be 
almost impossible to achieve if the data set was collected by outside researchers.  
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The validity of factors was supported by the use of diverse sources of information and the internal 
validity was guaranteed by the search for common patterns that explain the phenomena. The 
information gathered from the interviews was triangulated with the quantitative information from the 
desk research. Having access to knowledgeable informants with long term relationships with the 
firm, and longitudinal quantitative data, offered the possibility to gain rich insights. For example, in 
order to analyze the effect of employee ownership on HRM outcomes, key data of satisfaction and 
absenteeism surveys were presented to the interviewees, who were asked to tell their version of “the 
story behind the numbers”. Since satisfaction and absenteeism surveys showed various results for 
different segments of the workforce identified in terms of employment status, age, rank, and so on, 
we interrogated the different stakeholders about their own interpretations of those differences and the 
ways they made sense of the data. Different points of view were surfaced and tested, by feeding back 
the accounts of interviewees (unascribed) to others and asking them to comment. Throughout this 
historical account, interviewees were asked questions about particular decisions and processes in the 
company, and critical external events, and how these affected the demise of the company. These 
included perceptions of the company’s strengths and weaknesses in HRM policies. 
Results  
Clashes between employee ownership in Fagor and recruitment and selection policy: perverse 
nepotism 
According to almost all our informants, rather than attracting better workers, lower-quality workers 
were more likely to join Fagor Electodomésticos in basic blue collar positions due to what Padgett et 
al. (2015) describe as “bad nepotism”. Other Mondragon cooperatives have applied nepotistic 
recruitment policies, combining them appropriately with criteria of meritocracy and implementing 
guidelines and boundaries in the sense proposed by Bellow (2003) and Laker and Williams (2003). 
Fagor, on the other hand, gave preference to the offspring of members without requiring most of 
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them to meet any minimum educational standards. Interviewees classed this policy of nepotistic 
recruitment and selection as “unsuitable”, “a problem”; “a fatal error”, “a perverse policy”, “the 
absolute evil”, “a terrible social mistake”, “a disaster”, “a cancer”, and so on. Only two of the 
twenty-five interviewees (one member of the Social Council and a trade union representative) played 
down the gravity of nepotistic selection policies.  
Specific details of this policy are given below. The last regulation on selection of new members at 
the Fagor Group, comprising eight working cooperatives, was published on 23 May 2002. Under 
these rules, up to 30 points out of a possible 100 were awarded for having a parent who was a 
member. This compares to just 10 points for having more than 5 years’ work experience and 16 
points extra for having higher-level secondary education, as opposed to having no educational 
qualifications whatsoever.  
This recruitment policy led to adverse selection in terms of skills and attitudes. Most interviewees 
also said that many members used this nepotistic policy to favour their offspring with poorer 
training, skills and attitudes:  
 “If you have a child who’s not very bright, you send them to the cooperative. Why? 
Obviously, a bright child will find work elsewhere (…). That happened a lot in Mondragon. 
(…) If you're required to take in the children of members with no qualifications, then the 
worst tends to happen. Members’ children make less effort too. They know they're going to be 
made members at the end of the trial period. They’re not motivated and they don't value hard 
work.” (Fagor manager) 
Some interviewees justified the low level of qualifications required of new members in a Taylorist 
production model like that at Fagor Electrodomésticos: “You don't need to be Einstein to put screws 
into a washing machine. There were plenty of people at Fagor Electrodomésticos who had no 
training because it wasn't needed” (Fagor manager). For this reason, most interviewees felt that the 
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lack of engagement and commitment seen among many members’ children joining the company was 
more important than their lack of educational qualification. 
According to the interviewees, managers at Fagor and the HR department tried repeatedly to increase 
the requirements for membership.  Employee ownership conditioned the adoption of boundaries and 
all change proposals failed because of the opposition of worker owners in the Social Council and the 
General Assembly: 
“At one General Assembly, we discussed a proposal from the personnel staff that all new 
members, including direct labour, regardless of the score for being members' children, 
should sit an aptitude test and have an interview to screen them in some way. But the General 
Assembly voted against the move. That was what Fagor was like from a social point of view” 
(Fagor manager) 
Now, with the benefit of hindsight and given the gravity of the outcome, even some of those who 
defended nepotistic recruitment policies on the Social Council and argued against any change 
recognise that the policy was a serious social and business error: 
“The entry of member's children was a terrible social error (…) We’ve created a serious  
problem of ‘in-breeding’ in the cooperatives (…); we scored them based on the parent’s 
seniority and demanded very little in terms of educational qualifications. So, all kinds of 
people joined the company, including people who really didn't perform, people who didn't 
even pass the trial period. (…). It was a social error, and it was mistake on our (the Social 
Council’s) part to have defended that sort of thing [emphatically].”  (Member of Fagor’s 
Social Council)  
Even if managers blame the Social Council and rank and file cooperative members in the General 
Assembly for maintaining a “bad nepotism” recruitment policy, it could also be argued that it was 
management’s fault for not taking the lead and convincing cooperative members of the need for a 
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change. In many other Mondragon cooperatives managers in the early 1990s had had the leadership 
and pedagogical skills to convince opposing cooperative members of the need to establish minimum 
training requirements (vocational training degrees) for all new cooperative members and instituting 
filters in the recruitment process to avoid recruiting new members with poor attitudes.  
According to some of the interviewees, another reason for this lax and misguided policy on 
recruiting member's children was the limitation the cooperative faced in financing expansion and the 
need to ensure that members did not withdraw their capital from Fagor after they retired. Under the 
rules for new Fagor Group members, children of retired members enjoyed the same status as children 
of active members, provided the parents retained their economic stake in the company (Fagor, 2002; 
Norma de selección de ingresos 23/5/2002, p.10).  
Clashes between employee ownership and the recruitment and selection policy can be specially hard 
when the worker cooperative is recruiting large numbers of new members. Whyte and Whyte (1988) 
and Kasmir (1996) report that many previous worker-manager conflicts in Fagor took place after 
periods when the membership had expanded rapidly and there had been insufficient time to induct 
and train  members and introduce them to the meaning of cooperativism. According to our 
informants, the growth of Fagor and the need to replace many retiring cooperative members forced 
the company to hire close to 1,000 new members between 1997 and 2003. Some years, up to 300 
new members were hired in a single recruitment round, making it impossible to transmit the 
cooperative and corporate culture to new entrants: 
“It was like a tsunami. In just one year, it’s difficult to assimilate 300 new members aged 
between 18 and 20, people who’ve dropped out of school because what they want is money 
and a 9-to-5 job. You put them all together, with their own culture and their vision (…). And 
there’s nobody by their side to instil our previous culture of effort and commitment to them. 
(…). There’s no one left, they've all gone” (Fagor manager) 
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As in previous rapid expansions of Fagor reported by Rothchild and Whitt (1986), this mass influx of 
1,000 new members seems to have eroded the cultural values of previous generations, resulting in a 
cultural shift in which the balance between the cooperative members’ rights and obligations was lost: 
“There was a very clear change in culture from the mid-90s on. Many of members' children 
came in with low educational qualifications and they viewed being a cooperative member as 
being something like a civil servant. ‘I’ve got job security, no one’s ever going to fire me. I 
can say whatever I feel like. I have plenty of rights but I don't think I have any obligations, or 
at least not many’. That has been the prevailing culture in recent years, especially among 
younger people.” (Fagor manager) 
Attitudinal and behavioral responses to employee ownership and HRM policies among 
different workforce segments in Fagor 
According to the interviewees, the induction of many new young cooperative members with little 
training and poor attitudes towards work and cooperative values was the main reason for a worsening 
in the HRM outcomes, such as absenteeism, between the mid-1990s and the demise of the company 
in 2013.  
While the first researchers of the ‘Mondragon Experience’ reported that absenteeism rates of 
cooperative members were about half those in comparable local firms (Bradley and Gelb, 1981; 
Thomas and Logan, 1982), absenteeism rates of cooperative working members in Fagor were a 
constant cause for concern for HR managers in its final two decades. 
Absenteeism rates had been below 4% until 1995, but doubled in a decade as shown in Figure 1.   
(Insert Figure 1 about here) 
The long term increase in sick leave rates over the 1995-2013 period did not have obvious medical 
reasons. The company had invested millions in new factories, production lines and processes that 
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improved ergonomics and safety in the workplace, thus reducing the risk of accidents, injuries and 
sickness due to the work conditions. In addition, the average age of cooperative members went down 
in this period, from 45.5 in 1999 to 43 in 2006 (Fagor 2006), something that theoretically should 
have contributed to lower absenteeism rates.  
We could only gather comparative data of absenteeism rates for different ownership status in the 
parent company for 2010 (an absenteeism rate of 3.37% for non owners compared with 8.8% for 
working owners) and for 2013 (1.02% and 6.28% respectively). Former managers in the HR 
department confirmed that absenteeism rates were higher for cooperative members than for non 
members in the long term and that deterioration in commitment began as soon as the candidates were 
converted into cooperative owners. According to the interviewees, a greater sense of job security 
underlies those results, as in the researches of Blasi et al. (2008) and Basterretxea and Storey (2017): 
“The moment they became members, their sense of commitment just slipped away. (…), Being 
a member was almost like being in the public service. Absenteeism sky-rocketed, especially 
on Mondays. I think it was a lack of commitment. And I think Human Resources should have 
come down harder on them.” (Fagor manager) 
As Figure 2 shows, the number of days of sick leave per 100 employees were much higher than the 
average in more than 100 Mondragon cooperatives and also much higher than the number considered 
to be normal by the HR department of Fagor (0.33 sick absences/employee/year1). 
(Insert Figure 2 about here) 
As in the case of Eroski (Basterretxea and Storey, 2017), internal analyses of absenteeism in Fagor 
show that when cooperative members get sick, they stay at home longer than the average employee 
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in Spanish firms for similar sickness (see Figure 3), which is interpreted as a sign of low 
commitment. 
(Insert Figure 3 about here) 
Absenteeism rates differed from some business units to others, with some reaching two digit sick 
leave rates in many years, as Lavavajillas (13.81% absence for sickness in 2010) and Lavadoras 
(12.51% in 2010). Managers argued that different cultures where developed in different business 
units. In smaller business units a culture of mutual control made it easier to fight against free riding 
and voluntary absenteeism in the sense proposed by Kruse et al (2004). Conversely, in large business 
units where there was massive recruitment of new members in the late 1990s and early 2000s, a more 
complacent corporate culture made shirking easier.  
Internal analyses on the causes of absenteeism conducted by the HR managers of Fagor over the 
years, and also the opinions gathered in our interviews, consider that absenteeism rates reflected a 
lack of responsible engagement and involvement with the cooperative project of many members, 
especially the younger blue collar working members: 
“Absenteeism among young people was two or three points higher than among older people 
who theoretically should have more health issues. (…) Absenteeism was concentrated to a 
great extent in direct labour and especially among the young. We concluded that there was a 
lower degree of engagement.” (Fagor manager)  
In 2005, the company conducted an analysis of absenteeism. It showed that 45% of all sick leave was 
being taken by the 18- to 35-year olds, who represented roughly 30% of the members. They 
accounted for 47.69% of all short-term sick-leave (1 to 3 days), where it was difficult for the 
company's medical services to check the validity of the claims. It can be deduced that this included 
most of the voluntary absenteeism. The report said that “our organization is sick” and estimated the 
cost of absenteeism at Fagor at €9,585,958 for 2005 alone — €2,396,489 in direct costs and 
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€7,189,469 in indirect costs (training substitutes, productivity losses, material losses, hours lost due 
to reorganization of selection processes, reorganization of the line and reduced quality). In March 
2007, at an Extraordinary General Assembly, the HR department warned of an “alarming rise in 
absenteeism which could create economic and social difficulties for the firm and threaten the whole 
Fagor Electrodomésticos business project.” They called for “this major problem to be solved”.  
The analysis “Absentismo 2010: Estado de Situación y Planes de Acción” reported even higher rates 
than in 2005, showing that high absenteeism had become chronic. 
(Insert Figure 4 about here) 
The increase in the absenteeism rate of working owners in 2009 and 2010 took place at a time when 
cooperative members took many austerity measures to face the crisis, including reducing their 
salaries and being relocated to other companies. Those measures created many social tensions and 
disputes, and, as in the case of Eroski (Basterretxea and Storey 2017), interviewees considered that 
increased absenteeism rates in 2009 and 2010 can be partially interpreted as a “silent response” of 
some cooperative owners to austerity measures. 
Apart from age, gender was also a topic of internal absenteeism analysis at Fagor, where women had 
on average 1.7 sick absences per year compared with 1.0 for men, according to the 2005 internal 
study. According to our interviewees, those gender differences were stable over time. In addition to 
the effect of maternity leave, interviewees and internal analyses conducted by the firm suggest the 
importance of women’s “double presence at work and at home” and also the fact that women were 
proportionally more likely to be in the least skilled positions where possibilities of sick absence were 
higher because of the monotony and repetitive nature of the tasks. The same reason explains why 
absenteeism was much higher among blue collar workers and in some business units and factories. 
Attitudinal responses measured in different satisfaction surveys conducted by Fagor are consistent 
with the behavioral responses. We had access to the results of the three last satisfaction surveys 
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conducted in 2003 (based on the responses of 2,910 employees out of 4,124), 2005 (2,417 out of 
4,148), and 2008 (1,859 out of 2,918). As Figure 5 shows, the business units with higher absenteeism 
rates are the ones with lower satisfaction rates (Pearson correlation -0.899, significant at the 0.01 
level (bilateral)). 
(Insert Figure 5 about here) 
In addition to the differences in culture mentioned above, different characteristics of employees 
working in different business units also explain disparities in satisfaction and absenteeism. As Figure 
6 shows, satisfaction of direct labor seems to be lower than that of indirect labor.  
(Insert Figure 6 about here) 
The satisfaction survey of 2003 offers even more fine grained results for different workforce 
segments (depending on age, tenure, income, training, and professional status) allowing a greater 
understanding of the differential effect of employee ownership on different groups.  
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
There seems to be evidence of an increasing trend of global satisfaction as age; tenure; training and 
salary and professional rank increases. However, the significance of differences cannot be formally 
assessed as the individual data are not available. 
As with the absenteeism results, age, salary and tenure seem to be positively associated to 
satisfaction. Satisfaction of younger cooperative members seems to be lower than that of older 
members, which could be interpreted as further evidence of the failure in the nepotistic recruitment 
policy and also a flaw in the training and transmission of cooperative and corporate culture to young 
millennials.   
Similarly, tenure and salary seem to be positively associated with satisfaction, supporting the 
previous study on ESOP companies conducted by Klein and Hall (1988). Unlike that study, however, 
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it would appear that in Fagor training might be also positively related to satisfaction. In fact, 
cooperative worker owners with a university degree were more satisfied than those with a vocational 
training degree or with only primary education. Vocational training made no difference. 
Interviewees linked higher satisfaction of indirect labor and higher rank and more educated members 
with absenteeism results of different business units. In fact, those business units with lower 
absenteeism rates (external organization and central services) are the units with more indirect labor, a 
higher percentage of university graduates and members in higher positions. 
Higher satisfaction of indirect labor and higher rank members would be consistent with previous 
studies on Fagor that found a stronger sense of ownership and stronger feeling of being part of the 
firm among technicians and managers than among rank and file cooperative workers (Kasmir, 1996, 
161-163).  
Recruitment and training policies explain to a great extent a higher satisfaction and commitment of 
higher rank members with university studies. As in other Mondragon cooperatives, recruitment for 
skilled technicians and university graduates was enhanced by the preferential recruitment of 
candidates coming from corporate training centers such as Mondragon University (Basterretxea and 
Albizu, 2011). Those corporate training centers produce candidates who are more familiar with 
cooperative culture and have a more favorable attitude toward joining a cooperative enterprise. Also, 
the recruitment and selection processes for technical and management positions took subjective 
indicators into account to ascertain if candidates shared basic cooperative values. 
As mentioned above, small differences in salaries between workers and managers, difficulty adapting 
to cooperative values and the continuous and critical internal control by cooperative worker owners 
in the Governing Council and General Assembly, made it very difficult to recruit managers from 
Investor Owner Firms. Those limitations made Fagor and other Mondragon cooperatives consider 
24 
 
technicians and managers as scarce and valuable strategic human capital, providing these members 
with extensive training (both technical and cooperative) and internal promotion opportunities. 
While lower rank members complained about the training policy in the satisfaction surveys, most of 
our informants considered that huge training opportunities were offered to working members but 
most members (especially those with lower training levels) were reluctant to follow training 
programs: 
“People didn’t see any need for training. The Social Council frequently complained that no 
training was being generated from the cooperative. We organised various programmes for 
training personnel in welding and modules but we just made fools of ourselves; people didn't 
want to do it and no one signed up. And in the Social Council itself, they stopped bringing up 
the issue because the evidence spoke for itself.”  (Fagor manager) 
Reluctance of cooperative members who lacked vocational training to receive training was also 
referred to by the four senior Basque Government officials responsible for industrial policy 
interviewed. All of them emphasized that when the company collapsed, public efforts to help 
redundant cooperative members receive formal vocational training to increase their employability 
where received with negative attitudes of many members and their representatives in the Social 
Council. 
Cooperative degeneration versus a reverse dominance hierarchy conditioning HRM policies  
For more than five decades Fagor was able to overcome the darkest prognostications of the 
cooperative degeneration thesis. Not only was the company profitable in the long term, but it 
maintained a large proportion of members in its workforce. As Table 1 shows, before the acquisition 
of the French firm Brandt in 2005, more than 60% of the workforce were still cooperative members. 
While Basque law allowed it to have up to 25% of wage labourers in the parent cooperative 
company, interviewees highlight that Fagor usually had a lower percentage of wage labourers, as a 
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sign of commitment to cooperative values and also due to the pressure of the Social Council. Seeing 
the failure of Fagor with hindsight, twenty four out of the twenty five interviewees consider that the 
only thing that could (perhaps) have saved Fagor commercially was a much more rapid and drastic 
cooperative degeneration. Instead of investing heavily in its Spanish factories in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, the company should have followed the delocalization path of other European 
competitors, progressively closing its less efficient factories in Spain and substituting expensive 
worker partners with cheaper hired wage-labourers in its Polish factory or in other cheap labor 
countries. Such a move, all interviewees agree, would have been impossible given the cooperative 
nature of Fagor and the impossibility of working owners voting in favour of firing themselves to hire 
cheaper wage-labourers. Instead of ‘goal degeneration’, most interviewees highlight that Fagor 
prioritized for too long the goal of maintaining cooperative jobs in the parent company, even if this 
goal was against profitability. 
Nor did the threatened “organizational degeneration” take place, according to our interviewees. In 
fact, instead of power and control being increasingly concentrated in a few oligarchic hands, 
interviewees describe the existence of a reverse dominance hierarchy.  
As reported by our interviewees, relationships between staff and management deteriorated to a great 
extent into an us-and-them acrimony, making it difficult to implement hard HRM decisions to turn 
around the vicious spiral into which the company had fallen.  
Many of the HR policies at Fagor seem to have been influenced by historical social conflicts between 
grass roots worker members and managers at the cooperative. Some of these conflicts persisted in the 
firm’s collective memory, conditioning HR policies for decades. While other smaller cooperatives 
have reduced shirking and complacent attitudes of some members, adopting performance evaluation 
and salary systems that penalize poor performers and shirking members, those kind of pay sanctions 
were not implemented at Fagor. When asked why, many of the interviewees referred to past social 
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conflicts, such as the strike of 1974. On that occasion, the management at Fagor tried to introduce 
job assessment systems. These would have allowed managers to make a subjective appraisal of the 
members working under them, evaluating certain qualitative variables such as work quality, 
responsibility, attitude toward others and cooperation. The strike of cooperative workers was over 
the system of evaluation and strikers insisted on the retention of egalitarian pay and abandoning 
supervisors’ discretionary role in rating individual workers. In subsequent decades, this would lead 
to a culture of remuneration based on egalitarianism, and little connection between pay and 
performance. Similar opposition of worker owners to pay for performance systems have been found 
in other big Mondragon cooperatives, such as Eroski (Basterretxea and Storey, 2017). 
Other social conflicts at the firm also ended with the defeat of proposals from management and the 
Governing Council at various General Assemblies. On several occasions, this resulted in mass 
resignations from the Governing Council or resignation or dismissal of the CEO and other senior 
executives. In May 1992 the Governing Council resigned en masse, led by chairman Javier 
Salaberria, when it failed to push through a proposal to modify executive pay (from a pay differential 
ratio of 1:3 to 1:6) at the General Assembly. Some interviewees also alluded to this resignation and 
the conflict that arose over executive remuneration between worker members and executive members 
as one of factors that conditioned the company's wage policies over subsequent decades. In 2006, 
CEO Pablo Mongelos proposed cutting salaries and performing extraordinary solidarity (unpaid) 
hours to tackle the crisis. His proposals were defeated at the General Assembly. After pressure from 
the Social Council, Mongelos was dismissed and the entire Governing Council and some members of 
senior management subsequently resigned. Most of the interviewees identified this dismissal of 
executives proposing tough and unpopular HR policies as a major turning point which helps explain 
the subsequent failure of Fagor. Adoption and implementation of later cutbacks was hindered and 
delayed by the power of the Social Council and a fear among management that the Social Council 
and the General Assembly might reject their proposals and that they might eventually be dismissed 
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like Mongelos. Measures that some interviewees believe might have avoided the complete collapse 
of the company - such as closure and transfer of highly loss-making units to low-cost countries - 
were not even raised, as executives were convinced they would be rejected by the General Assembly. 
When middle managers saw that the top managers’ priority was social peacekeeping and that they 
were afraid of the Social Council and General Assembly, the managerial capability of middle-
management and their capacity for influence amongst their teams was also reduced. Faced with 
problems of indiscipline, suspicion of voluntary absenteeism, low performance of some members or 
decisions to bring in new members, middle management did not feel they had the support of their 
superiors or of the HR Department. As in the case of another fully owned organization from 
Mondragon, Eroski (Basterretxea and Storey, 2017), this prompted many supervisors to shirk their 
monitoring tasks, adopting a laissez-faire leadership style in order to avoid conflicts with shirking 
members or even with descendants of members who aspired to become members, despite their low 
skills and poor attitudes. 
“As a manager, if you issued an unfavourable report after a candidate member's trial period 
and the Social Council defended the candidature, your judgement would be called into 
question. You would be called into question and crucified, [emphatically] crucified. (…) 
Many managers, the majority, backed down.  
Three years before the firm closed, all middle-managers attended a course. The instructor 
told us; “The managers at Fagor are neither authoritarian nor participative; you are 
relinquishers. You relinquish your function, but you don’t relinquish your salaries. That's the 
sort of managers you are”. That's what he said. And he was spot on! That relinquishing style 
of control extended to all the executives (…). But like it or not, we had no option if we wanted 
to survive.” (Fagor manager) 
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The reverse dominance hierarchy made sanctioning shirking members extremely difficult. As an 
example, economic penalties and sanctions imposed on members taking too many sick leaves 
slightly reduced sick leave rates between 2006 and 2008, but absenteeism went up again when 
sanctions of absent members were reduced or refunded because of the pressure from the Social 
Council.  
Clashes between employee ownership and rigid Taylorist production systems 
Since the early 1970s the executives at Fagor were concerned with the internal contradiction between 
the democratic cooperative system of government and the rigidity of the Taylorist profiles in the way 
labor relations were handled (Molina, 2006). They decided to promote new, more effective, ways of 
organising labor in some divisions that would be in harmony with cooperative values.  Nevertheless, 
according to some of the interviewees, the best way to operate many production units in the white 
goods industry is still on the Taylorist-Fordist system. Taylorist production systems are considered to 
be incompatible with the participation and autonomy of cooperative workers (Kurtulus and Kruse, 
2017) something that was stressed by some interviewees.  
“If someone is working eight hours a day on a production line… in structural terms, the work 
itself is a very important limiting factor. If you work on a production line, then you’re living 
in an environment of passive labour. You’re told what to do… You don't have the capacity to 
change things. You have a lower level of commitment and satisfaction. (…) If your job, your 
working environment, doesn’t match what you're being sold (autonomy, participation, etc.), it 
doesn't work….” (Mondragon senior manager) 
Those opinions are in line with previous research conducted in Fagor in the 1990s by Kasmir, who 
found that employee owners working in the assembly line felt they were treated as “chickens in a 
coop” (Kasmir, 1996, 187), exploited “just like any worker in any firm” (Kasmir, 1999, 386). 
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As well as lack of motivation, some interviewees said that members who feel alienated on Taylorist 
assembly lines tend to use their vote on cooperative management bodies like alienated workers rather 
than as worker-employers: 
“I think it’s counterproductive to have members on the assembly line performing a repetitive 
job eight hours a day. In those circumstances, however much ownership they may have, the 
reality of their day-to-day existence is a “nightmare”. (…) To add to it, those people have a 
vote, and they're the majority… So of course, that majority behaves as if they were in an 
investor-owned firm (…), but they have a vote. (…) In certain companies, cooperativising 
certain jobs is not a good idea, because it hinders competitiveness. Fagor Electrodomésticos 
was one of those cases.” (Mondragon senior manager) 
Employee involvement and participation in day-to-day decisions is extremely limited when working 
on an assembly line; training is unnecessary to conduct repetitive and simple tasks and the path of 
the chain exerts an automatic supervision and control over the employee. In fact, in the 2003, 2005 
and 2008 satisfaction surveys, some of the least valued items are “Participation in the work area”, 
“Professional development in the job” and “Training” (see Table 2). Evaluations of those items are 
especially weak among cooperative workers of lower professional rank and training level. Raised 
and unfulfilled participation expectations among rank and file employee owners is, therefore, 
interpreted as a cause of dissatisfaction, in line with previous research (Arando et al. 2015; 
Basterretxea and Storey, 2017; Ben-Ner and Jones, 1995; Klein and Hall, 1988; Kruse and Blasi, 
1995; McCarthy et al. 2010).   
Some production units, such as “Cooking”, organized workplace production systems and decision-
making in ways to get more employee input and involvement (e.g. with a basis of a participative 
TQM approach). After the mid-1990s, Cooking changed the layout of the factory, adopting u-shaped 
production cells that required a higher polyvalence of workers. Accordingly, all satisfaction surveys 
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we had access to, show higher satisfaction of workers in Cooking than in Taylorist production units, 
such as Frío. 
Other units of Fagor failed to conduct similar organizational changes, sometimes because of the 
opposition of cooperative working members, as in the case of Fagor Clima (Kasmir, 1996). In other 
cases (according to our interviewees) it was because of mismanagement and inability to replicate 
good practices, and in yet others it was because of the firm belief that the Taylorist model was the 
best for some production units.  
Discussion and Conclusions  
The present paper enhances our understanding of the relationships between fully employee-owned 
organizations (i.e. worker cooperatives), and HRM policies and outcomes in many ways.  
Our findings in Fagor suggest that age, tenure, salary, professional rank, and education were 
positively associated with a higher satisfaction. Behavioral responses might also differ in line with 
attitudinal responses, with more sick absences among younger worker owners and among direct 
labor. Women would appear to have higher absenteeism rates, mainly because of their higher 
representation in lower rank jobs. Given the relative different mix of worker characteristics in 
Fagor’s different business units, satisfaction and absenteeism rates differ between them. Similarly, 
different results in previous empirical research on the effect of employee ownership on employee 
attitudes and behaviors could have been caused by different compositions of the workforces in the 
firms that were studied. 
Our findings also enrich the existing literature, pointing out that employee ownership in worker 
cooperatives can clash with different HR policies. HR managers in mainly or fully employee-owned 
companies can face many limitations that make the implementation of high-performance HRM 
policies, or even standard HRM policies, very difficult.  
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Our research findings show that a major clash can happen between employee ownership in worker 
cooperatives and some individual HRM policies, such as recruitment and selection, performance 
evaluation, performance related pay and absence management. In the case of Fagor, the wrong 
people were recruited and selected due to a nepotistic recruitment policy, with the selection of the 
offspring of members with no training and poor working attitudes. Massive recruitment of close to 
1,000 new members, mostly descendants of members with little training and poor working attitudes, 
between the mid-1990s and 2003, provoked a significant drop in member commitment, according to 
interviewees. Those opinions were backed by satisfaction surveys and by rising absenteeism rates, 
most obviously among younger members. As our analysis shows, despite different efforts by the 
HRM department to change the recruitment policy and establish higher training requirements and 
more professional screening processes to evaluate the involvement and commitment of candidates to 
cooperative and corporate culture, employee owners opposed those changes repeatedly through the 
General Assembly and Social Council.  
While our study focuses on the case of Fagor Electrodomésticos, some of the clashes between 
employee ownership and HR policies documented here have also been documented in other large 
Mondragon cooperatives, such as Eroski (Basterretxea and Storey, 2017). Similarly, some of the 
forces that fostered nepotism in recruitment policies of this cooperative (free riding problems, 
financing problems, horizon problems) are common to other worker cooperatives. In fact, the 
regulation on selection of new members that promoted nepotism in Fagor Electrodomésticos was a 
regulation shared with seven other Mondragon cooperatives (Copreci, Arrasate, Automation, 
Ederlan, Electronica, Industrial and Mondragon Assembly). Further research is needed in order to 
evaluate how nepotistic policies have affected HR outcomes in other Mondragon cooperatives. 
HR departments of worker cooperatives should make an effort to avoid “bad” nepotism policies and 
implement guidelines and boundaries to the nepotism policies in order to reduce their negative 
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effects. Efforts will have to be made in the communication and creation of a culture that makes 
nepotism recruitment policies compatible with meritocratic criteria. 
Many of the negative HRM outcomes of Fagor were caused because of its size and previous rapid 
expansion of membership and because of the substitution of large numbers of retiring members by 
younger members. The massive induction of new young members impeded the maintenance and 
nurturing of the pre-existing cooperative and corporate culture. Some of our informants suggested 
that other Mondragon cooperatives that actually are very successful, such as Fagor-Ederlan, are also 
increasing their membership too fast and may face negative HRM outcomes in the future as 
happened in Fagor. Successful worker cooperatives in other regional settings, or worker cooperatives 
facing the substitution of a high percentage of their older and retiring members, should also be aware 
of the risks of rapid and massive recruitment. While many academics conceive the failure to transmit 
cooperative culture to new entrants as a training policy problem, the managers we interviewed 
consider this interpretation rather naïve. Formal cooperative training has been provided by Fagor and 
all Mondragon cooperatives to new entrants for years (Basterretxea and Albizu, 2010), but those 
programs have limited effects in changing attitudes, values and behaviors. Informal transmission of 
cooperative and corporate culture by members with longer tenure to newcomers is much more 
important. But such informal transmission is difficult when 1,000 new cooperative workers enter a 
firm in a few years, as happened in Fagor between 1996 and 2003, and many old members are 
retiring in the same period. Difficulties were exacerbated in some business units where generational 
replacement was more extreme. Other worker cooperatives facing similar growth or generational 
replacement needs, should consider the importance of securing the informal transmission of the 
organizational culture. Besides hiring new members, relocating older members from some business 
units to others can be necessary to ensure that all business units have a minimum percentage of long 
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tenured employee owners who can transmit the organizational employee-ownership culture to 
newcomers informally. 
Fagor’s case is also an instructive lesson for many investor-owned firms that wish to foster ESO. 
Those companies operating in industries where rigid Taylorist production systems still offer the most 
productive way of working should think twice before promoting employee ownership plans to all 
their workforce. When production systems prevent significant participation of the employee in day-
to-day operational decisions and working life, offering ownership rights to employees can increase 
their expectations of participation, expectations that inevitably will be frustrated and denied by the 
reality of their daily working experience. 
For those worker cooperatives that already have such a disjunction between their Taylorist 
production systems and the participation and autonomy fostered by the cooperative model, some of 
our informants proposed some good examples of other Mondragon cooperatives, that in the past had 
conventional Taylorist production systems with low training requirements, and have changed their 
production system to get a higher congruence with cooperative values and be able to achieve 
cooperative advantages. Those changes have required more automation of production processes and 
reducing the workforce dramatically, but the remaining worker owners are highly qualified, with 
more responsibility and enriched tasks, which fits better with the autonomy and participation that the 
cooperative model fosters. 
Our findings show that a set of HRM policies rooted in the cooperative nature of Fagor exacerbated 
the problems of the company and made the turnaround significantly more difficult. Many of the 
former managers and workers of Fagor we have interviewed are actually relocated to other 
Mondragon cooperatives. This provides them the opportunity to see whether other cooperatives have 
learnt the lessons of Fagor’s failure. When it comes to HRM lessons, most interviewees note that 
other cooperatives are now much more cautious in their recruitment and selection policies. 
34 
 
Educational requirements of potential new members have been raised and subjective evaluations of 
candidates’ work ethic and involvement with cooperative values are now much more important. 
A key to understanding all the HRM problems in Fagor and the persistent inability of management to 
solve them may be the impoverished managerial capabilities of managers at all levels, due to a 
reverse dominance hierarchy. Working and managing associations of laborers ‘under managers 
elected and removable by themselves’ - as Mill predicted would be the norm if mankind improved - 
seems to be a really complex issue. In his Principles Mill himself referred to a set of ‘admirable 
qualities’ by which the pioneering worker owned organizations maintained workers in increasing 
prosperity: ‘Their rules of discipline, instead of being more lax, are stricter than those of ordinary 
workshops; but being rules self-imposed, for the manifest good of the community, and not for the 
convenience of an employer regarded as having an opposite interest, they are far more scrupulously 
obeyed, and the voluntary obedience carries with it a sense of personal worth and dignity’ (Mill, 
1987; p. 778). It might be wise to reflect on the present prevalence of another conflict of interests: 
the opposite interest between the convenience of some employees and the ‘manifest good of the 
community’. This conflict seems hard to manage in worker cooperatives in the modern society in 
which they are embedded. This is particularly the case in large organizations, where the ‘self-
imposition’ is more easily watered down. 
Limitations and avenues for further research  
The main limitations of this study are those inherent in the qualitative methodology used and the type 
of company analyzed. As stated, methodological precautions were considered in the field-work to 
limit potential biases, such as a the tendency to minimize suggestions of managerial failures by 
interviewed managers, and the potential inclination to give self-indulgent opinions by member-
workers. Yet those and other similar biases could have affected some outcomes. 
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Fagor was the biggest industrial cooperative of the Mondragon experience, and many results can be 
useful for other big fully employee-owned companies. Nevertheless, the generalization of these 
results to other cooperatives and other types of ESO firms should be treated with caution.  
As Jaumier (2017) suggests, reverse dominance hierarchies and subsequently weakened leadership of 
managers may be more widespread among worker cooperatives than suggested by the current state of 
the literature. Further research is needed to analyze the possible presence of reverse dominance 
hierarchies in ESO firms where the majority of shares and votes are on the hands of workers. 
Similarly, the effect of employee ownership on HRM outcomes for different segments of the 
workforce will also have to be studied in different kinds of employee owned firms operating in other 
industries and countries. 
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Figure 1: Sick leave rates* of Fagor Electrodomésticos cooperative working members 1995-2013 
 
*Sick leave rates= % of sick and accident leave hours / total working hours. Data for 2011 and 2012 was not 
available. 
Source: Data gathered from the company.   
 
Figure 2: Sick absence processes per 100 coop working members 
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Source: Data gathered from the company 
 
Figure 3: Duration of sick absence processes in Fagor compared to Mondragon cooperatives 
and Spanish firms in 2005 
 
Source: Data gathered from the company. 
 
Figure 4:  Percentage of total sick absences in relation to the age brackets 
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Source: Data gathered from the company. 
 
Figure 5: Satisfacction and absenteeism in different business units of Fagor Electrodomésticos  
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Figure 6: Global satisfacton Direct labor/Indirect Labor & Members/non members 2003-2008 
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Table 1: Evolution of different employment models in Fagor Electrodomésticos (2000–2011). 
  
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Cooperative 
working members 3,067 3,520 3,424 3,393 3,082 2,718 2,474 2,325 2,219 2,067 
Total employment 5,917 5,835 10,163 10,543 10,067 9,861 8,405 8,260 6,641 5,673 
% of cooperative 
working  members 51.83% 60.33% 33.69% 32.18% 30.61% 27.56% 29.43% 28.15% 33.41% 36.44% 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on Annual Reports of Fagor (2003-2012).  
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Table 2: Satisfaction of cooperative members depending on age, tenure, training, salary index 
and professional group in the 2003 satisfaction survey 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Global
<30 2,8 2,7 2,8 3,1 2,9 2,8 3,1 2,9 3,3 3,4 3,4 2,94
31-40 2,8 2,5 2,8 3 2,8 2,8 3 2,9 3,4 3,5 3,6 2,97
41-50 3 2,5 2,8 3,1 3 2,9 3 3 3,4 3,5 3,6 3,04
>50 3,1 2,5 2,9 3,2 3 3 3,2 3,1 3,5 3,6 3,6 3,13
5 or less 2,8 2,7 2,8 3,1 2,9 2,8 3,1 2,9 3,3 3,4 3,4 2,96
6-15 3 2,5 2,9 3,1 2,9 2,9 3,1 3 3,5 3,6 3,6 3,04
16-25 2,9 2,4 2,8 3,1 3 2,9 3 3,1 3,5 3,5 3,6 3,04
more than 25 3 2,5 2,9 3,1 3 2,9 3,1 3,1 3,5 3,6 3,6 3,06
Primary 2,9 2,6 2,8 3 2,9 2,9 3 3 3,3 3,5 3,4 2,98
Mid level Vocat. Training2,9 2,6 2,7 3,1 2,9 2,9 3,1 2,9 3,4 3,5 3,5 3,01
Superior Vocat. Training2,9 2,5 2,8 3,1 2,9 2,8 3,1 2,9 3,5 3,5 3,5 2,98
University 3,1 2,8 3 3,3 3,1 3 3,3 3,2 3,5 3,6 3,7 3,16
1-1.35 2,8 2,6 2,7 3 2,8 2,8 3 2,8 3,3 3,4 3,4 2,9
1.36-1.6 3 2,4 2,9 3,2 2,9 2,9 3,1 3,1 3,5 3,6 3,6 3,08
1.61-2 3,2 2,6 3,1 3,3 3,1 3,2 3,3 3,3 3,6 3,8 3,8 3,27
2.01-2.4 3,4 2,7 3,3 3,4 3,3 3,2 3,5 3,4 3,6 3,9 3,8 3,4
> 2.41 3,6 2,9 3,7 3,8 3,6 3,6 3,6 3,7 3,8 4 4 3,67
Direct labor 2,8 2,6 2,7 3 2,8 2,8 3 2,8 3,3 3,4 3,4 2,91
Sellers, technicians, assistants3,2 2,6 3,1 3,3 3,1 3,1 3,4 3,3 3,6 3,8 3,7 3,26
Managers & supervisors3,5 2,8 3,6 3,7 3,5 3,5 3,5 3,6 3,8 4 4 3,57
AGE
TENURE
TRAINING
SALARY INDEX
PROF. GROUP
Source: Data gathered from the company. (1.- Working conditions; 2.- Economic reward; 3.- Professional 
growth and training; 4.- Organiztion of work; 5.- Information-communication; 6.- Participation; 7.- Working 
environment; 8.- Management and supervision; 9.- Strategies, goals and future of the organization; 10.- 
Identification with the cooperative; 11.- Corporate values; 12.- Average satisfaction) 
 
 
  
 
